Metaphysical realism and moral relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam's reason, truth and history

Journal of Philosophy 79 (10):568-575 (1982)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Putnam rejects "metaphysical realism," which takes "the world" to be a single complex thing, a connected causal or explanatory order into which all facts fit. he argues that such metaphysical realism is responsible for views he finds implausible; in particular, it can lead to moral relativism when one tries to locate the place of value in the world of fact. i agree that metaphysical realism will lead a thoughtful philosopher to moral relativism, but find neither of these views implausible. in particular, putnam's main argument against metaphysical realism seems fallacious and his suggested alternative, to think of truth as the idea limit of rational inquiry, is clearly incorrect.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why reason can't be naturalized.Hilary Putnam - 1983 - In Realism and reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-24.
Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity.Anders Öberg - 2011 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
Goodman and Putnam on the making of worlds.Damian Cox - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):33 - 46.
Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding.Gordon Steinhoff - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363.
Magic, semantics, and Putnam’s vat brains.Mark Sprevak & Christina Mcleish - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):227-236.
Putnam's model-theoretic argument(s). A detailed reconstruction.Jürgen Dümont - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
Realism and reason.Hilary Putnam (ed.) - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
334 (#55,133)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

A Putnam's Progress.Ernest Lepore & Barry Loewer - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):459-473.
Theories of rationality and principles of charity.Robert Wachbroit - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):35-47.
Causal cognition and causal realism.Riccardo Viale - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):151 – 167.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references