More on explaining a gap

Abstract

In (Harman 2007) I argued “that a purely objective account of conscious experience cannot always by itself give an understanding of what it is like to have that experience.” Following Nagel (1974), I suggested that such a gap “has no obvious metaphysical implications. It [merely] reflects the distinction between two kinds of understanding,” objective and subjective, where subjective understanding or “Das Verstehen” (Dilthey 1883/1989) of another creature’s experience involves knowing what it is like to have that experience—knowing what sort of experience of one’s own would correspond to the other creature’s experience.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,597

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Objective Phenomenology.Andrew Y. Lee - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1197–1216.
Something like ability.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
Color.Eric M. Rubenstein - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Physicalism and subjectivity.John Kekes - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):533-6.
Subjective experience and points of view.Robert M. Francescotti - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
De se preferences and empathy for future selves.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.
Bernard Lonergan's Transcendental Realism.Victoria Marie Wulf - 2000 - Dissertation, Fordham University

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
44 (#508,392)

6 months
44 (#105,914)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references