More on explaining a gap

Abstract

In (Harman 2007) I argued “that a purely objective account of conscious experience cannot always by itself give an understanding of what it is like to have that experience.” Following Nagel (1974), I suggested that such a gap “has no obvious metaphysical implications. It [merely] reflects the distinction between two kinds of understanding,” objective and subjective, where subjective understanding or “Das Verstehen” (Dilthey 1883/1989) of another creature’s experience involves knowing what it is like to have that experience—knowing what sort of experience of one’s own would correspond to the other creature’s experience.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,766

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
44 (#261,436)

6 months
1 (#386,499)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Subjective Experience and Points of View.Robert M. Francescotti - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
A Phenomenal Case for Sport.Jens E. Birch - 2009 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 3 (1):30-48.
Color.Eric M. Rubenstein - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Engineering the Mind (Review of Dretske 1995, Naturalizing the Mind). [REVIEW]Kent Bach - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):459-468.
Something Like Ability.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.