Abstract

This article is concerned with the famous passage toward the end of the Protagoras often referred to as containing the argument against the possibility of akrasia or weakness of will, where Socrates sets out a hedonistic position and on its basis argues against the possibility of being overcome by pleasure. The article explores the function of the hedonistic position in the philosophical argumentation of the dialogue. To this purpose, it traces the repeated emphasis in the text that the hedonistic thesis is a premise in the argument against the weakness of will as well as in the argument that an art of measurement will be the salvation of our life. Displaying how the text likewise underlines that this premise is accepted by Protagoras on behalf of the many, the author maintains that these arguments are not plausibly read as supporting Socrates’ own views and that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, Socrates is not denying the possibility of akrasia or of being overcome by pleasure. The article seeks to show how Socrates’ arguments function collectively as a reductio ad absurdum of the hedonistic thesis itself. Underpinning the interpretation with reference to details of the dramatic exchange between Protagoras and Socrates, and pointing to parallels with the Theaetetus and thePhaedrus, the article further argues that Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras in this part of the dialogue aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is.