Hume's moral epistemology

Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press (1976)
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B1499.E8.H37

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0198245661   0198750374

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10.2307/2219048
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Citations of this work

The Predicament of Moral Epistemology.Sushruth Ravish - 2019 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (2):265-279.
Recasting Scottish Sentimentalism: The Peculiarity of Moral Approval.Remy Debes - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (1):91-115.
Making and finding values in nature: From a Humean point of view.Y. S. Lo - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):123 – 147.
Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation.Julia Jorati - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):748-766.
Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.

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