Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):1-17 (2020)
AbstractDespite clear overlap between the study of extended minds and the study of group minds, these research programs have largely been carried out independently. Moreover, whereas proponents of the extended mind thesis straightforwardly advocate the view that there are, literally, extended mental states, proponents of the group mind thesis tend to be more circumspect. Even those who advocate for some version of the thesis that groups are the subjects of mental states often concede that this thesis is true only in some loose or metaphorical sense. I argue that this imbalance is a mistake. A literal interpretation of the group mind thesis is no less plausible than the extended mind thesis, because group minds are particularly defensible instances of extended minds. However, the extended mind thesis, and the view that group minds are extended minds, are defensible only following a revision of the extended mind thesis.
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References found in this work
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge.Avram Hiller & R. Wolfe Randall - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-17.
Collective Intellectual Humility and Arrogance.Keith Raymond Harris - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6967-6979.
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