Flexing the imagination

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (3):247–258 (2003)
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Abstract

I explore the claim that “fictive imagining” – imagining what it is like to be a character – can be morally dangerous. In particular, I consider the controversy over William Styron’s imagining the revolutionary protagonist in his Confessions of Nat Turner. I employ Ted Cohen’s model of fictive imagining to argue, following a generally Kantian line of thought, that fictive imagining can be dangerous if one has the wrong motives. After considering several possible motives, I argue that only internally directed motives can satisfy the moral concern. Finally, I suggest that when one has the right motives, fictive imagining is morally praiseworthy since it improves one’s ability to imagine the lives of others.

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James Harold
Mount Holyoke College

Citations of this work

Free will and moral responsibility in video games.Christopher Bartel - 2015 - Ethics and Information Technology 17 (4):285-293.
Literature and Knowledge.John Gibson - 2009 - In Richard Eldridge (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Literature. Oxford University Press.
On judging the moral value of narrative artworks.James Harold - 2006 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (2):259–270.
Ethics and Imagination.Joy Shim & Shen-yi Liao - 2023 - In James Harold (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethics and Art. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 709-727.

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References found in this work

Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
How can we fear and pity fictions?Peter Lamarque - 1981 - British Journal of Aesthetics 21 (4):291-304.
Identifying with metaphor: Metaphors of personal identification.Ted Cohen - 1999 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57 (4):399-409.

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