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Abstract
The idea that conscious control, or more specifically akratic wrongdoing, is a necessary condition for blameworthiness has durable appeal. This position has been explicitly championed by volitionist philosophers, and its tacit influence is broadly felt. Many responses have been offered to the akrasia requirement espoused by volitionists. These responses often take the form of counterexamples involving blameworthy ignorance: i.e., cases where an agent didn’t act akratically, but where they nevertheless seem blameworthy. These counterexamples have generally led to an impasse in the debate, with volitionists maintaining that the ignorant agents are blameless. In this paper, I explore a different sort of counterexample: I consider agents who have acted akratically, but whose very conscious awareness of their wrongdoing complicates their blameworthiness. I call these cases of “complex akrasia,” and I suggest that they are a familiar aspect of moral life. I interpret these cases as supporting non-volitionist accounts, and particularly Quality of Will accounts.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  volitionism  akrasia  quality of will  blameworthiness  ignorance  awareness  moral responsibility
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DOI 10.5840/jpr20201124150
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References found in this work BETA

Who Knew?: Responsiblity Without Awareness.George Sher - 2009 - Oxford University Press USA.
Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral and Factual Ignorance: A Quality of Will Parity.Anna Hartford - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1087-1102.

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