Bayes Nets and Rationality

In The Handbook of Rationality. Boston, Massachusetts, USA: (2021)
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Abstract

Bayes nets are a powerful tool for researchers in statistics and artificial intelligence. This chapter demonstrates that they are also of much use for philosophers and psychologists interested in (Bayesian) rationality. To do so, we outline the general methodology of Bayes nets modeling in rationality research and illustrate it with several examples from the philosophy and psychology of reasoning and argumentation. Along the way, we discuss the normative foundations of Bayes nets modeling and address some of the methodological problems it raises.

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Stephan Hartmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

The Myside Bias in Argument Evaluation: A Bayesian Model.Edoardo Baccini & Stephan Hartmann - 2022 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 44:1512-1518.
A New Approach to Testimonial Conditionals.Stephan Hartmann & Ulrike Hahn - 2020 - In CogSci 2020 Proceedings. Toronto, Ontario, Kanada: pp. 981–986.
How to Revise Beliefs from Conditionals: A New Proposal.Stephan Hartmann & Ulrike Hahn - 2021 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Society 43:98-104.

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