Authors
Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University
Abstract
Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our intuitions; it does not require us to acknowledge that life is a harm, or that a world devoid of life is a good thing; and it is easy to see why it does not have any pro-mortalist implications.
Keywords Antinatalism  Benatar  Having children  Having kids  Morality of procreation  Prima Facie duties  Ethics of procreation  Reproductive ethics  Parenthood
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DOI 10.1080/02580136.2012.10751770
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References found in this work BETA

Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Revisionary Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
Deontic Morality and Control.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Hypothetical Consent Objection to Anti-Natalism.Asheel Singh - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1135-1150.
Does the Lack of Cosmic Meaning Make Our Lives Bad?Thaddeus Metz - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (1):37-50.
Genome Editing for Longer Lives: The Problem of Loneliness.C. S. Wareham - 2020 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 17 (2):309-314.
Better to Return Whence We Came.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (1):85-100.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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