Truth without People?

Philosophy 72 (279):85 - 104 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is a venerable tradition according to which the concept of truth is totally independent of human beings, their actions and beliefs, because truth consists in the correspondence of mind-independentpropositions to a mind-independent reality. For want of arespect. One way of doing so is relativism, the idea that whether a belief is true or false depends on the point of view of individuals or communities. A closely related position is a consensus theory of truth, according to which a belief is true if it is held by a group of people. In a similar vein, the pragmatist theory maintains that a true belief is one which it is expedient for us to accept

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,122

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Telling each other the truth.William D. Backus - 2006 - Minneapolis, Minn.: Bethany House.
Minimalism and the value of truth.By Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517.
Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth.Alberto Vanzo - 2010 - Kant Studien 101 (2):147-166.
On truth.Harry G. Frankfurt - 2006 - New York: Knopf.
Pragmatic halos.Peter Lasersohn - 1999 - Language 75 (3):522-551.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
42 (#346,790)

6 months
8 (#209,681)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hans-Johann Glock
University of Zürich

Citations of this work

Animals, thoughts and concepts.Hans-Johann Glock - 2000 - Synthese 123 (1):35-104.
The Doing and the Deed: Action in Normative Ethics.Constantine Sandis - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:105-126.
On the mind dependence of truth.Diego Marconi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The structure and content of truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
The second person.Donald Davidson - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):255-267.
Truth.Alan R. White & J. M. Shorter - 1972 - Philosophical Books 13 (1):35-36.
Philosophical Logic, an Introduction.Sybil Wolfram - 1989 - Studia Logica 54 (2):258-261.
Malcolm and Searle on 'Intentional Mental States'.P. M. S. Hacker - 1992 - Philosophical Investigations 15 (3):245-275.

Add more references