Situationist deontic logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):423-448 (1997)
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Situationist deontic logic is a model of that fraction of normative discourse which refers to only one situation and one set of alternatives. As we can see from a whole series of well-known paradoxes, standard deontic logic (SDL) is seriously mistaken even at the situationist level. In this paper it is shown how a more realistic deontic logic can be based on the assumption that prescriptive predicates satisfy the property of contranegativity. A satisfactory account of situation-specific norms is a necessary prerequisite for a successful treatment of more complex normative structures



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Sven Ove Hansson
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

Citations of this work

The meaning of 'ought'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 127-160.
Multiplex semantics for deontic logic.Lou Goble - 2000 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (2):113-134.
But what should I do?Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):433-440.

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References found in this work

Ethical Consistency.B. A. O. Williams & W. F. Atkinson - 1965 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 39 (1):103-138.
Imperatives and logic.Alf Ross - 1944 - Philosophy of Science 11 (1):30-46.
Imperatives and Logic.Alf Ross - 1944 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):48-48.
Permissions and Supererogation.Joseph Raz - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (2):161 - 168.

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