`Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments

Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):21-31 (1990)
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Abstract

Two arguments are discussed which have been advanced in support of eliminative materialism: the argument from reductionism and the argument from functionalism. It is contended that neither of these arguments is effective if "non-scientific realism" is adopted with regard to commonsense propositional attitude psychology and its embedded notions. "Non-scientific realism," the position that commonsense propositional attitude psychology is an independently legitimate descriptive/explanatory framework, neither in competition with science nor vulnerable to being shown false by science, is defended

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Barbara Ellen Hannan
University of New Mexico

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