Lange on essentialism, counterfactuals, and explanation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):81 – 85 (2005)
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Abstract

Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is - with minor modification - compatible with essentialism.

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Author's Profile

Toby Handfield
Monash University

Citations of this work

Could the laws of nature change?Marc Lange - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):69-92.
Some Laws of Nature are Metaphysically Contingent.John T. Roberts - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):445-457.
Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on essentialism, laws, and counterfactuals.Marc Lange - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):581 – 588.
Laws and Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature.Barbara Vetter - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):83 - 86.

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References found in this work

The big bad bug: What are the humean's chances?John Bigelow, John Collins & Robert Pargetter - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):443-462.
A note on scientific essentialism, laws of nature, and counterfactual conditionals.Marc Lange - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):227 – 241.
Armstrong and the modal inversion of dispositions.Toby Handfield - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):452–461.
Counterlegals and necessary laws.By Toby Handfield - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):402–419.

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