Do we need second-order probabilities?

Dialectica 62 (4):525-533 (2008)
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Although it has often been claimed that all the information contained in second-order probabilities can be contained in first-order probabilities, no practical recipe for the elimination of second-order probabilities without loss of information seems to have been presented. Here, such an elimination method is introduced for repeatable events. However, its application comes at the price of losses in cognitive realism. In spite of their technical eliminability, second-order probabilities are useful because they can provide models of important features of the world that are cognitively more plausible than those that can be obtained with single-level probabilities.



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Sven Ove Hansson
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

Citations of this work

Can Uncertainty Be Quantified?Sven Ove Hansson - 2022 - Perspectives on Science 30 (2):210-236.
Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Revising Probabilities and Full Beliefs.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1005-1039.

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Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.Frank H. Knight - 1921 - University of Chicago Press.
Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1986 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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