Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):213-214 (2015)

Casper Storm Hansen
Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Sciences
This paper describes a scenario in which a person in his afterlife will with probability 1 spend twice as many days in Heaven as in Hell, but, even though Heaven is as good as Hell is bad, his expected utility for any given day in that afterlife is negative
Keywords infinity  decision theory  expected utility  probability
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.180
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