Coordination and expertise foster legal textualism
Ivar Hannikainen,
Kevin Tobia,
Guilherme de Almeida,
Noel Struchiner,
Markus Kneer,
Piotr Bystranowski,
Niek Strohmaier,
Sammy Bensinger,
Kristina Dolinina,
Bartosz Janik,
Egle Lauraityte,
Michael Laakasuo,
Alice Liefgreen,
Ivars Neiders,
Maciej Prochnicki,
Alejandro Rosas,
Jukka Sundvall &
Tomasz Zuradzki
Abstract
A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a widespread tendency to rely on a rule’s letter over its spirit when deciding which acts violate the rule. This tendency’s strength varied markedly across (k = 15) field sites, owing to cultural variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared to laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether, and consequently exhibited more pronounced textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: In a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants’ adherence to rules’ literal meaning. Together, these studies (Ntotal = 5495) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule’s purpose, the rule’s literal meaning provides a clear focal point—an easily identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers and judges.