Being Good With the Past

Dissertation, Durham University (2019)
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Abstract

This thesis seeks to provide the first comprehensive response to the interrelated two questions of what it means to be good with the past and what role should be entrusted to the archaeological academy. I will be adopting a neo-Aristotelian approach in my response to these questions, using observations of the human animal and its lifecycle to inform my understanding of what being good entails generally, before applying it to what being good with the past entails specifically. The first third of the thesis will provide my argument for turning to the virtue ethical tradition, and a naturalistic approach to virtue for the purposes of archaeological ethics. Meanwhile, the second third will focus on the implications this perspective has on the role we should entrust to archaeologists. And the final third is devoted to how the good of archaeology and the role of the archaeologist should be understood in a world with goods other than the good of archaeology.

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