Abstract

This dissertation studies the extent to which Aristotle's biological ideas can teach us about his metaphysical ideas. I focus on Aristotle's embryological ideas and whether they have anything to contribute to a long-standing dispute about the metaphysics of substance. ;The first part of this dissertation focuses on Aristotle's embryological science. I pay special attention to two embryological explanations: how embryos differentiate into males and females and how they inherit traits from individual ancestors, such as when an offspring inherits the shape of her father's nose or her mother's eyes. I set out how these explanations are constructed in order to create a picture of how Aristotle builds a scientific explanation. ;The second part of this dissertation analyzes the metaphysical ideas within these explanations. I set out the roles of the form, matter and motion in the formation of the offspring, and how the offspring comes to acquire its essential and accidental qualities. ;The final part evaluates the extent to which these explanations teach about Aristotle's conception of substance. I argue that the embryological accounts do not have metaphysical consequences concerning substance. The alleged metaphysical consequences of the embryology are largely based on a mistaken identification of the moving cause and the formal cause. ;I conclude that Aristotle's embryology contributes to our understanding of the metaphysics of generation and motion, but does not contribute to the dispute about substance