A Complexity Basis for Phenomenology: How information states at criticality offer a new approach to understanding experience of self, being and time

Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 119:288–302 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the late 19th century Husserl studied our internal sense of time passing, maintaining that its deep connections into experience represent prima facie evidence for it as the basis for all investigations in the sciences: Phenomenology was born. Merleau-Ponty focused on perception pointing out that any theory of experience must in accord with established aspects of biology i.e. embodied. Recent analyses suggest that theories of experience require non-reductive, integrative information, together with a specific property connecting them to experience. Here we elucidate a new class of information states with just such properties found at the loci of control of complex biological systems, including nervous systems. Complexity biology concerns states satisfying self-organized criticality. Such states are located at critical instabilities, commonly observed in biological systems, and thought to maximize information diversity and processing, and hence to optimize regulation. Major results for biology follow: why organisms have unusually low entropies; and why they are not merely mechanical. Criticality states form singular self-observing systems, which reduce wave packets by processes of perfect self-observation associated with feedback gain g=1. Analysis of their information properties leads to identification of a new kind of information state with high levels of internal coherence, and feedback loops integrated into their structure. The major idea presented here is that the integrated feedback loops are responsible for our ‘sense of self’, and also the feeling of continuity in our sense of time passing. Long-range internal correlations guarantee a unique kind of non-reductive, integrative information structure enabling such states to naturally support phenomenal experience. Being founded in complexity biology, they are ‘embodied’; they also fulfill the statement that ‘The self is a process’, a singular process. High internal correlations and RenéThom-style catastrophes support non-digital forms of information, gestalt cognition, and information transfer via quantum teleportation. Criticality in complexity biology can ‘embody’ cognitive states supporting gestalts, and phenomenology’s senses of ‘self,’ time passing, existence and being.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Causal Efficacy of Phenomenal Consciousness.Harvey Mccloud - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Kansas
Understanding complexity: Are we making progress?Geoffrey K. Chambers - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):747-756.
The Information Medium.Orlin Vakarelov - 2012 - Philosophy and Technology 25 (1):47-65.
Brain-Inspired Conscious Computing Architecture.Wlodzislaw Duch - 2005 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (1-2):1-22.
Quantum Information as a General Paradigm.Gennaro Auletta - 2005 - Foundations of Physics 35 (5):787-815.
Quantum Criticality of Ground and Thermal States in XX Model.Wonmin Son & Vlatko Vedral - 2009 - In Institute of Physics Krzysztof Stefanski (ed.), Open Systems and Information Dynamics. World Scientific Publishing Company. pp. 16--02.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-28

Downloads
881 (#15,808)

6 months
91 (#45,401)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
Phénoménologie de la perception.M. Merleau-Ponty - 1949 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 5 (4):466-466.

View all 8 references / Add more references