Abstract

This dissertation looks at several arguments for toleration, which have been made by modern liberals. It examines the possibility of finding an argument for toleration, which will be universally applicable, i.e. will convince everyone. In the first essay the arguments of Thomas Nagel, John Rawls and J. S. Mill are discussed. I demonstrate how these arguments work only if a commitment to certain values, such as the importance of autonomous choice by individuals, is presupposed. ;In the second essay I relate the subject of toleration to the notion of the separateness of persons. I argue that a commitment to the importance of preserving that separateness will lead to a commitment to toleration. A discussion of the various ways in which utilitarianism fails to preserve that separateness follows. I suggest ways in which utilitarianism can be corrected so that it will preserve the separateness of persons and therefore will be committed to toleration. It is demonstrated how communitariam writers do not take seriously the separateness of persons and how this should lead them not to value toleration. ;In the third essay I consider the possibility of arguing for toleration on epistemological grounds. I discuss the relevance of Monism, Relativism and Pluralism, and conclude that neither can provide a universal argument for or against toleration, the reason being that neither of these doctrines is accepted by everyone. I then discuss the liberal requirement that the state should remain neutral between the various conceptions of the good held by its citizens. I ask whether neutrality is neutral, i.e. whether it will lead to a neutrality between various conceptions of the good and whether it is not grounded on a commitment to a certain value or idea of the good. These questions are examined in relation to the suggestions of Larmore, Rawls and Scanlon. I demonstrate how none of these writers can provide an argument for neutrality and toleration that does not presuppose a certain conception of the good.