Ethics 127 (1):06-26 (2016)

Authors
Matthew Hammerton
Singapore Management University
Abstract
It is common to distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are agent-relative from those that are agent-neutral. One can also distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are moment-relative from those that are moment-neutral. In this article, I introduce a third distinction that stands alongside these two distinctions—the distinction between moral rules, reasons, or values that are patient-relative and those that are patient-neutral. I then show how patient-relativity plays an important role in several moral theories, gives us a better understanding of agent-relativity and moment-relativity, and provides a novel objection to Derek Parfit’s “appeal to full relativity” argument.
Keywords agent-relative  time-relative  moment-relative  patient-relative  appeal to full relativity  patient-relativity  patient-neutral  patient-neutrality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1086/687330
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Should the Numbers Count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.
Structures of Normative Theories.James Dreier - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
The Consequentialist Perspective.Philip Pettit - 1997 - In M. Baron, P. Pettit & M. Slote (eds.), Three Methods of Ethics. Blackwell.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From Agent-Neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.
Consequentializing Moral Dilemmas.Jussi Suikkanen - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):261-289.
Relativized Rankings.Matthew Hammerton - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 46-66.
Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses.Jörg Löschke - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):477-491.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella.Jennie Louise - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536.
The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction: My Two Sense (S).Jessica Lerm - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):137-148.
An Argument for Agent-Neutral Value.David Alm - 2007 - Ratio 20 (3):249–263.
Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent Relative?Douglas W. Portmore - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (4):363-77.
Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral Vs. Agent-Relative.Michael Ridge - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Shape of Practical Reasons: A Defense of Agent-Neutralism.Michael Raymond Ridge - 1999 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
What, If Anything, Are Colours Relative To?John Hyman - 2005 - Philosophy 80 (4):475-494.
Deontic Restrictions Are Not Agent-Relative Restrictions.Eric Mack - 1998 - Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (2):61.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-06-14

Total views
353 ( #26,579 of 2,461,839 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
71 ( #10,849 of 2,461,839 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes