Is ‘Representation’ a Folk Term? Some Thoughts on a Theme in Science Studies

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (3):132-149 (2022)
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Abstract

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 3, Page 132-149, June 2022. An influential strand within Science and Technology Studies rejects the idea that science produces representations referring to objects or processes that exist independently of it. This radical ‘turn’ has been framed as ‘constructionist’, ‘nominalist’, and more recently as ‘ontological’. Its central argument is that science constructs or enacts rather than represents. Since most practitioners of science believe that it involves representation, an implication of the radical turn must be that ‘representation’ is a folk concept; perhaps even a myth or an ideology. This paper explores this anti-representationalism and its implications for the relationship between STS and mainstream social science, in part through drawing parallels with ethnomethodology.

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Citations of this work

Comment on Martin Hammersley, “Is ‘Representation’ a Folk Term?”.Michael Lynch - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (4):258-267.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Social Imagery.David Bloor - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):195-199.
Laboratory Life. The Social Construction of Scientific Facts.Bruno Latour & Steve Woolgar - 1982 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 13 (1):166-170.
Handbook of Qualitative Research.N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln - 1994 - British Journal of Educational Studies 42 (4):409-410.

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