Abstract
In my paper, I defend an interpretation according to which Aristotle thinks in
Nicomachean Ethics (EN) that the rational aspect of soul is needed in discerning
which ends of desire would be good. Many interpreters have traditionally supported
this, ‘rationalist’ line of interpreting Aristotle’s theory of value cognition. The
rationalist interpretation has, however, recently come under a novel challenge from
Jessica Moss (2011, 2012), but has not yet received a defence. Moss attempts to
resurrect now virtually abandoned ‘anti-rationalist’ interpretation, which claims, in a
contrast to the rationalist one, that discerning good ends may require no activity from
the rational aspect, but only well-habituated non-rational desire. Moss’ interpretation
appeals to certain Aristotle’s claims in De Anima (DA) 3, which, she thinks, show that
non-rational phantasia suffices for discerning good ends if only accompanied with the
habituated desire. Although her interpretation can successfully avoid some problems
that earlier anti-rationalist interpretations faced with certain passages of EN, I also
argue, however that it introduces some new problems, and attributes philosophically
incoherent views about moral responsibility to Aristotle. Therefore I conclude that
even after Moss’ improvements to the anti-rationalist interpretation, the rationalist
interpretation remains overall more plausible.