Aristotle on The Cognition of Value

Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):88 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In my paper, I defend an interpretation according to which Aristotle thinks in Nicomachean Ethics (EN) that the rational aspect of soul is needed in discerning which ends of desire would be good. Many interpreters have traditionally supported this, ‘rationalist’ line of interpreting Aristotle’s theory of value cognition. The rationalist interpretation has, however, recently come under a novel challenge from Jessica Moss (2011, 2012), but has not yet received a defence. Moss attempts to resurrect now virtually abandoned ‘anti-rationalist’ interpretation, which claims, in a contrast to the rationalist one, that discerning good ends may require no activity from the rational aspect, but only well-habituated non-rational desire. Moss’ interpretation appeals to certain Aristotle’s claims in De Anima (DA) 3, which, she thinks, show that non-rational phantasia suffices for discerning good ends if only accompanied with the habituated desire. Although her interpretation can successfully avoid some problems that earlier anti-rationalist interpretations faced with certain passages of EN, I also argue, however that it introduces some new problems, and attributes philosophically incoherent views about moral responsibility to Aristotle. Therefore I conclude that even after Moss’ improvements to the anti-rationalist interpretation, the rationalist interpretation remains overall more plausible.

Similar books and articles

Aristotle on perception.Stephen Everson - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry.Joseph Owens - 1992 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Aristotle's theory of practical cognition.Takatsura Andō - 1971 - The Hague,: Martinus Nijhoff.
Aristotle.J. M. E. Moravcsik - 1967 - Garden City, N.Y.,: Anchor Books.
Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality.Ian Mccready-Flora - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):394-435.
Aristotle’s Aesthetic Ethics.John Milliken - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):319-339.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-04

Downloads
648 (#23,746)

6 months
119 (#26,155)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

If phrónêsis does not develop and define virtue as its own deliberative goal — what does?Olav Eikeland - 2016 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 18 (2):27-49.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Nicomachean ethics.H. Aristotle & Rackham - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael Pakaluk.
Reason and human good in Aristotle.John Madison Cooper - 1975 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Aristotle’s “De Anima”: A Critical Commentary.Ronald Polansky - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references