There Is No Special Problem of Mindreading in Nonhuman Animals

Philosophy of Science 82 (3):473-490 (2015)
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There is currently a consensus among comparative psychologists that nonhuman animals are capable of some forms of mindreading. Several philosophers and psychologists have criticized this consensus, however, arguing that there is a “logical problem” with the experimental approach used to test for mindreading in nonhuman animals. I argue that the logical problem is no more than a version of the general skeptical problem known as the theoretician’s dilemma. As such, it is not a problem that comparative psychologists must solve before providing evidence for mindreading



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Marta Halina
Cambridge University

References found in this work

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
There Is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation.Craig Callender & Jonathan Cohen - 2006 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (1):67-85.

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