Phenomenal properties as dummy properties

Philosophical Studies 135 (2):199 - 223 (2007)
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Abstract

Can the physicalist consistently hold that representational content is all there is to sensory experience and yet that two perceivers could have inverted phenomenal spectra? Yes, if he holds that the phenomenal properties the inverts experience are dummy properties, not instantiated in the physical objects being perceived nor in the perceivers.

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10.1007/s11098-005-1064-8

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Citations of this work

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How You Know You’re Conscious: Illusionism and Knowledge of Things.Matt Duncan - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):185-205.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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