John Locke and Natural Human Rights: An Inconsistency Between His Metaphysical/Epistemological Positions and His Moral/Political Theories

Dissertation, St. John's University (New York) (1981)
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Abstract

The author concentrates on John Locke's doctrine of natural rights, particularly in light of the latter's metaphysical views. Locke's denial of the objectivity of certain metaphysical principles, e.g., substance, and his polemics against the science of metaphysics itself, weaken his position as an advocate of natural rights. In the mind of the author, the negation of objective certitude concerning metaphysical principles of substance, formal causality, final causality, and so forth, erodes the basis, sufficient for a natural rights doctrine. The problem that ensues upon Locke's analysis of natural rights is of profound significance: can any epistemological view establish an objective and sufficient foundation for the doctrine of natural rights? ;The criticism of the Lockean interpretation of natural rights commences with his own views on natural rights, e.g., from the Essays on the Law of Nature, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and so forth. Upon reflection of these passages, one perceives a dual basis for a natural rights theory in Locke: the rationalistic approach and the hedonistic element. With these two possible explanations serving as the justification for natural rights, the author examines the two pivotal issues of substance and person in Locke's philosophy. Since the bearer of these natural rights is a person and since a person constitutes a substantial entity, an examination of Locke's position is crucial in criticizing his doctrine of natural rights. In light of Locke's perspective regarding the issues of substance and person, the author discusses the influence of Locke's epistemological position on his doctrine concerning natural rights. ;By comparing Locke's analysis of and justification for a natural rights doctrine with the outlook of moderate realism, the author concludes the following points: the role of metaphysics in establishing the objectivity of natural rights; and the need for a comprehensive metaphysics as a basis for a doctrine on natural rights. The metaphysics of moderate realism provides a comprehensive ontological view of reality that focuses on the final end of the human person. Instead of limiting the cognitive endeavors of the human intellect, as does Locke, the philosophical insights of moderate realism expand the horizon of human certitude

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