Indefinite extensibility and the principle of sufficient reason

Philosophical Studies 178 (2):471-492 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The principle of sufficient reason threatens modal collapse. Some have suggested that by appealing to the indefinite extensibility of contingent truth, the threat is neutralized. This paper argues that this is not so. If the indefinite extensibility of contingent truth is developed in an analogous fashion to the most promising models of the indefinite extensibility of the concept set, plausible principles permit the derivation of modal collapse.

Similar books and articles

Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):147-166.
Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility.Jared Warren - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):81-122.
A Note on Gabriel Uzquiano’s “Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility”.Simon Hewitt - unknown - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (3):455-459.
Dummett on Indefinite Extensibility.Øystein Linnebo - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):196-220.
Extending Everything with Nothing.Filippo Costantini - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1413-1436.
Extending Everything with Nothing.Filippo Costantini - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1413-1436.
Extending Everything with Nothing.Filippo Costantini - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1413-1436.
Extending Everything with Nothing.Filippo Costantini - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1413-1436.
Grim’s arguments against omniscience and indefinite extensibility.Laureano Luna - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):89-101.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-03-10

Downloads
621 (#28,122)

6 months
133 (#27,650)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Geoffrey Hall
University of Notre Dame (PhD)

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
Making Things Up.Karen Bennett - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

View all 31 references / Add more references