On Hartshorne’s Objections to Determinism and Compatibilism

Eikasia Revista de Philosophia 54:93-106 (2014)
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Abstract

The problem of determinism and human freedom, which is one of the great debates in philosophy, has been discussed many times by philosophers who have very distinctive perspectives and thereby different results related to the problem. Charles Hartshorne as an American process philosopher has significantly contributed to the debate with his own thoughts and considerations. His thoughts can be divided into two major parts. First is the claim that there is a relative indeterminism within the universe. Second is that (hard) determinist and compatibilist positions have serious theoretical and practical difficulties. This paper is only about second part of his thoughts related to the debate. So, in this paper, firstly, I attempt to depict and examine his objections to the arguments for determinism and compatibilism. And then, secondly, I try to interrogate two fundamental assumptions behind his objections. One is the fallacy of burden of proof and other is a fallacy based on the appeal to common sense in order to prove any factual or metaphysical assertion.

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Chaos, indeterminism, and free will.Robert C. Bishop - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 84-100.
Causal necessities: An alternative to Hume.Charles Hartshorne - 1954 - Philosophical Review 63 (4):479-499.
Contingency and the new era in metaphysics (I).Charles Hartshorne - 1932 - Journal of Philosophy 29 (16):421-431.

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