Abstract
In chapter 2, Myers introduces the conception of morality as a cooperative undertaking to promote the overall good on terms fair to everyone involved. Fair promotion of the overall good, he argues, requires impartial beneficence to be restrained by prerogatives and restrictions. The rationale for prerogatives turns, ultimately, on the premise that promoting the overall good fairly must account for the fact that we inevitably have values other than our concern for impartial beneficence. It would be unfair, because too demanding, to require people fully to subordinate these competing values to their goal of promoting overall goodness. For “acting in ways that are true to all one’s values is an important ideal of individual behaviour” and so must be given some play. Fairness, then, requires balancing one’s concern to promote the overall good with one’s concern to be faithful to the other values that apply to one. Myers favors a “no-harm” version of prerogatives that allows people to give their own interests and desires a disproportionate weight only in cases where advancing their own ends would prevent them from giving aid to others.