Authors
Jaap Hage
Leiden University
Abstract
This article describes how the facts in social reality take an intermediate position between objective facts and purely subjective ‘facts’. In turn, these social facts can be subdivided into constructivist and non-constructivist facts. The defining difference is that non-constructivist facts are completely determined by an approximate consensus between the members of a social group, while constructivist facts are founded in such a consensus but can nevertheless be questioned. Ought fact are such constructivist facts. Because they are founded in social reality, a naturalistic theory of ought facts is attractive. Because constructivist facts are always open to questioning, we can explain why the facts in social reality may found ought facts but are nevertheless not the final word about them.
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DOI 10.1007/s11196-022-09896-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Cambridge University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40).David Hume - 1978 - Oxford University Press.
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.

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