To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity By Sanford Goldberg [Book Review]

Analysis 80 (3):608-610 (2020)
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_ To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity _ By GoldbergSanfordOxford University Press, 2018. xvi + 278 pp.

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10.1093/analys/anaa028

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To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity.Sanford Goldberg (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Relying on others: an essay in epistemology.Sanford Goldberg - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification.Sanford Goldberg - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.
Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):364-383.
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Epistemic Risk and Community Policing.Kay Mathiesen - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):139-150.
Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.
The epistemic costs of politeness.Sanford Goldberg & Guiming Yang - 2017 - Think 16 (46):19-23.
Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony.Judith Baker & Philip Clark - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):178-199.
Epistemic Justification Revisited.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):1-16.
Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):407-430.
The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Conditions on Testimonial Knowledge.Sanford Goldberg - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen R. Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.

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Joshua Habgood-Coote
University of Leeds

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