Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms

Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper I consider the prospects for an epistemic norm which relates knowledge-how to showing in a way that parallels the knowledge norm of assertion. In the first part of the paper I show that this epistemic norm can be motivated by conversational evidence, and that it fits in with a plausible picture of the function of knowledge. In the second part of the paper I present a dilemma for this norm. If we understand showing in a broad sense as a general kind of skill teaching, then the norm faces counterexamples of teachers who know how to teach, but not to do. On the other hand, it we understand showing more narrowly as involving only teaching by doing the relevant activity, then the data which initially supported the norm can be explained away by more general connections between knowledge-how and intentional action.

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Joshua Habgood-Coote
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.
What's the point of knowing how?Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):693-708.
Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - 2025 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn, Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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