On a theological argument for fatalism

Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159 (1974)
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Abstract

It is the aim of this paper to show that [the theological argument from Divine omniscience] is not more than a needlessly (and confusingly) elaborate version of the argument for fatalism discussed by Aristotle in de Interpretatione 9, which, since its sole premise is the Principle of Bivalence, may conveniently be called the logical argument for fatalism. If this is right, if the theological premisses of the theological argument can be shown to be strictly irrelevant to the fatalist conclusion, then it follows that it is pointless to try to avoid fatalism by modification of those theological premisses.

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Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
Determinisms.Vladimir Marko - 2016 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 29:115-141.

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