Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476-491 (2013)

Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, also show that there are non-standard preference relations. Hence frameworks of Gert and Rabinowicz's type are either inadequate since there are cogent arguments for both non-standard value and preference relations and these frameworks deny this, or they lack support since the arguments for non-standard value relations are unconvincing. Instead, I propose a simpler framework that allows for both non-standard value and preference relations.
Keywords value-preference symmetry  value relations  preference relations  fitting-attitude analysis of value  Joshua Gert  Wlodek Rabinowicz
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.12025
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References found in this work BETA

The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Brentano and the Buck-Passers.Sven Danielsson & Jonas Olson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):511 - 522.
Value Relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
Value and Parity.Joshua Gert - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):492-510.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.
Value Taxonomy.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), Handbook of Value. Oxford: Oxfocd University Press. pp. 23-42.

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