Noûs 50 (4):854-864 (2016)

Authors
Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Abstract
Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12122
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
Value Relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.

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Citations of this work BETA

Taking Values Seriously.Krister Bykvist - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6331-6356.

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