Practical imagination as enabling practical rationality

Veritas: Revista de Filosofía y Teología 39:9-31 (2018)
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Abstract

Resumen El uso del término imaginación remite a un cierto tipo de actividad mental que en su formulación más básica refiere a la capacidad humana para crear imágenes en ausencia de lo representado, es decir, para representarnos objetos o estados de cosas que están ausentes, y a la capacidad para crear imágenes a partir de otras que ya se poseen. Esta formulación permite dar cuenta de una amplia gama de experiencias humanas que van desde la creación artística y la innovación técnica hasta la anticipación de posibles escenarios en los que intervenir. En particular voy a centrarme en un uso específico de la imaginación que denominaré imaginación práctica y que consiste principalmente en la anticipación contrafáctica de posibles estados de cosas resultantes de nuestras acciones. A partir de esto sostendré la existencia de una relación interna entre imaginación práctica y racionalidad práctica, en virtud de la cual la primera oficia de posibilitadora de la segunda. Para ello relevaré cuatro formas de ejercicio de la racionalidad práctica que han sido tematizadas a lo largo de la historia de la filosofía: la ética, la moral, la política y la legal.The use of the term imagination refers to a certain type of mental activity that in its most basic formulation refers to the human capacity to create images in the absence of what is represented, that is, to represent objects or states of things that are absent, and the ability to create images from others that are already possessed by the agent. This formulation allows to account for a wide range of human experiences ranging from artistic creation and technical innovation to the anticipation of possible scenarios in which to intervene. In particular, I will focus on a specific use of the imagination that I will call practical imagination and that consists mainly in the counterfactual anticipation of possible states of affairs resulting from our actions. From this perspective I will sustain the existence of an internal relation between practical imagination and practical rationality, by virtue of which the first enables the second. To do this, I will highlight four types of practical rationality that have been thematized throughout the history of philosophy: ethical, moral, political and legal rationality.

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Gustavo Pereira
Universidad de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay

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References found in this work

Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Inquiry.Jon Barwise - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):429.

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