Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):81-110 (2020)

Authors
Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Abstract
Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made possible by a fourth category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality.
Keywords population ethics  Critical-Level Utilitarianism  Critical-Range Utilitarianism  the Repugnant Conclusion  the Sadistic Conclusion
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Totalism Without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich & Ketan Ramakrishnan (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-231.

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