Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):159-174 (2014)

Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York
Olle Torpman
Stockholm University
One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the arguments that have been levelled against My Favourite Theory and offer some arguments against intertheoretic comparisons of value
Keywords moral uncertainty  intertheoretic comparisons of value  My Favourite Theory  moral conscientiousness
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12022
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Utilitarianism and Co-Operation.Donald Regan - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences.Ted Lockhart - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Uncertainty.Krister Bykvist - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12408.
Discounting for Public Policy: A Survey.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):391-439.
Intertheoretic Value Comparison: A Modest Proposal.Christian Tarsney - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):324-344.

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