Does the Collapsing Principle Rule Out Borderline Cases?

Utilitas 30 (4):483-492 (2018)
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If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome’s Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two alleged counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this paper, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that it is implausible.



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Johan E. Gustafsson
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

Value relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.
The Origin of The Knowledge of Right and Wrong. Franz Brentano.G. E. Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (1):115-123.
Value and parity.Joshua Gert - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):492-510.

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