Consciousness and Cognition 4 (3):323-45 (1995)

There is a traditional view of pain as a conscious phenomenon which satisfies the following two principles at least: Pain is essentially a belief- or cognition-independent sensation, given for consciousness in an immediate way, and pain′s unitary physical base is responsible for both its phenomenal or felt qualities and it′s functional, causal features. These are "The Raw Feels Principle" and "The Unity of Pain Principle" . Each is shown to be implausible. Evidence comes from recent pain research in a number of dimensions. A further argument against The Unity of Pain Principle is constructed by analogy with facts about blindsight. The consequences of rejecting P or Q are examined in light of the traditional epistemological role of pain as exemplar of sensations thought to be foundational for knowledge, the prospects of a modularity theory of the pain system, recent accounts of pain among contemporary philosophers, a naturalist and realist conception of pain, and views about the status of Folk Psychology
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DOI 10.1006/ccog.1995.1041
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Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap.Donald F. Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.
Pain, Qualia, and the Explanatory Gap.Don Gustafson - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.

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