A motivational approach to confirmation: An interpretation of dysphagic patients' experiences

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 15 (4) (1994)
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Abstract

In this paper we articulate confirmation and disconfirmation as components in human motivation. We develop a theory of motivation on the basis of a model of human action and we explore aspects of confirmation and disconfirmation in the context of the meeting of dysphagic patients with their physicians. We distinguish four central elements in confirmation and disconfirmation and use these and the relations between them for the purpose of constructing a typology. Finally, on the basis of the results obtained we interpret a small volume of remarks reflecting the meaning field of some dysphagic patients in relation to their physicians. The underlying motive is to develop tools for understanding health care processes. The SAUC-Confirmation-Model and the theoretical framework in which it is embedded should be seen from that point of view.

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