The Truth about Realism: Natural Realism, Many Worlds, and Global M-Realism

Philosophia 47 (5):1487-1499 (2019)
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Abstract

An attempt was made to show how we can plausibly commit to mathematical realism. For the purpose of illustration, a defence of natural realism for arithmetic was developed that draws upon the American pragmatist’s, Hillary Putnam’s, early and later writings. Natural realism is the idea that truth is recognition-transcendent and knowable. It was suggested that the natural realist should embrace, globally, what N. Tennant has identified as M-realism (Tennant 1997, 160). M-realism is the idea that one rejects bivalence and assents to the recognition-transcendent requirement. It was argued that over-all—for all domains—the natural realist should be a M-realist, with the aim of clarifying the realist debate for arithmetic.

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References found in this work

Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (122):47-67.

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