Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truth

Synthese 195 (3):1065-1075 (2018)
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Abstract

We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the biconditionals of the form “ ‘A’ is true iff A.”

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Author Profiles

Shawn Standefer
National Taiwan University
Anil Gupta
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

The Final Cut.Elia Zardini - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (6):1583-1611.
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References found in this work

Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1970 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Pursuit of truth.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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