How Should We Build Epistemic Community?

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 34 (4):561-581 (2020)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT One of the promises of the internet was its power to unite individual knowers with one another, democratizing knowledge and spurring our collective efforts toward truth. In what sense is our current epistemic life a collective effort? This article examines the idea of the epistemic community. I contrast epistemic community with a collection of individual epistemic agents aiming for truth. I propose that this latter conception of epistemic life permits neglecting our epistemic and moral duties. I argue that healthy epistemic community requires joint commitments to truth and epistemic trust, and where epistemic trust requires conditions of mutual epistemic respect.

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Hanna Gunn
University of California, Merced

References found in this work

Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Two kinds of respect.Stephen L. Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.

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