Abstract
In the first part of this essay, some of the strategies atheists use to claim undeserved privileges for their position are analyzed. In particular, the connection between evidentialism and the idea that atheism is the natural starting position (“presumption of atheism”, Anthony Flew) is discussed. In addition, the extent to which the elimination of agnosticism as the third option between theism and atheism contributes to the discursive privilege of atheism is examined (with Paul Cliteur). In the second part, evidentialism is reconstructed as a context-dependent theory of justification and the (A) theism problem is situated in the context of action instead of the context of knowledge. This avoids one-sided distribution of the burden of justification, especially the atheistic attempt to to burden the theist with the full burden of justification and at the same time to free the atheist from all burdens of justification. In this way, the discourse on the (a) theism problem can be reconstructed without assigning undeserved privileges.