Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):69-87 (2007)
AbstractIn the first part of this paper I will characterize the specific nature of rational intuition. It will be claimed that rational intuition is an evidential state with modal content that has an a priori source. This claim will be defended against several objections. The second part of the paper deals with the so-called explanationist objection against rational intuition as a justifying source. According to the best reading of this objection, intuition cannot justify any judgment since there is no metaphysical explanation of its reliability. It will be argued that in the case of intuition the very demand of such an explanation is based on a category mistake.
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Citations of this work
An Integrative Design? How Liberalised Modal Empiricism Fails the Integration Challenge.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5655-5673.
Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.
Is Intuition Based On Understanding?[I Thank Jo].Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.
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