Abstract
¿Puede un filósofo, sin más, tomar el lado de las víctimas, cuando se trata de situaciones de justicia e injusticia? ¿Puede carecer de un punto de vista objetivo acerca de lo que es moralmente bueno o malo? Si el filósofo sostiene que lo que las víctimas demandan, en lugar de redistribución, es reconocimiento, ¿debe proveer una convincente teoría de lo que es el reconocimiento y del modo como él juega un papel en las situaciones de justicia e injusticia? Este artículo contrasta las teorías de Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser y Axel Honneth, filósofos que establecen un nexo entre justicia y reconocimiento y que coinciden, además, en inscribirse en la tradición teórico-crítica. Ellos difieren en explicar cómo el reconocimiento está implicado en los conflictos y las demandas políticas. El artículo trata de proveer una explicación para estas diferencias a partir de diferencias meta-filosóficas sobre la filosofía política como empresa intelectual. When talking about justice and injustice, can philosophers, simply, take the victims' side? Even when these philosophers belong to the critical theoretical perspective, can they be excused from providing an objective account of what is morally wrong? If, for instance, they hold that victims are demanding recognition, instead of redistribution, don't they need a social theory about how recognition plays its role in the shaping of justice and injustice? This article addresses these questions in regard to Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. Although they subscribe to the critical theory's tradition, as well as involve recognition when talking about justice, their paths go in different directions when they have to explain how recognition is involved in social conflicts and political demands. The main purpose is to show that their differences have to do, mainly, with two different understandings of political philosophy as an intellectual enterprise
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References found in this work BETA

Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.C. L. Ten - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):563-566.

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