Genuineness resolved: a reply to Reiss' purported paradox

Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):255 - 261 (2013)
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Abstract

This response to Reiss ?explanatory paradox? argues that some economic models might be true, and that many economic models are not intended for providing how-actually explanations, but rather how-possibly explanations. Therefore, two assumptions of Reiss? paradox are not true, and the paradox disappears

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Till Grüne-Yanoff
Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm

References found in this work

Laws and explanation in history.William H. Dray - 1957 - Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Appraising Models Nonrepresentationally.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):850-861.
Making models count.Anna Alexandrova - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (3):383-404.

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