Abstract

In this dissertation I examine Leibniz's theories of divine providence and foreknowledge in the context of the two main competing accounts available in his day, Molinism and Thomism. I argue that although his theories share some of the broad features of these two accounts, Leibniz departs substantially from the views of his predecessors. I show how Leibniz is able to account for divine foreknowledge and providence in a way that avoids some of the major problems facing the Molinists and the Thomists. I argue that Leibniz's account turns on two of his most enduring metaphysical theses: universal causal determinism, and optimism--the thesis that God always acts in the best possible way. Understanding Leibniz's determinism allows us to see how Leibniz could hold that God's knowledge of creatures is conceptual knowledge, while at the same time holding that this knowledge depends on God's free decrees. Although the importance of Leibniz's determinism in his solution to theological problems has been appreciated by scholars, the importance of his optimism has not. I think that this view finds application, beyond theodicy, in the solution to several vexing problems in Leibnizian philosophical theology. In particular, I show how Leibniz's optimism can be used to explain God's knowledge of "counterfactuals of freedom." Seeing how Leibniz deployed his metaphysical principles to solve theological problems sheds light on those principles and Leibniz's philosophical system as a whole