Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):217-229 (2015)

Abstract
Marr's levels of analysis—computational, algorithmic, and implementation—have served cognitive science well over the last 30 years. But the recent increase in the popularity of the computational level raises a new challenge: How do we begin to relate models at different levels of analysis? We propose that it is possible to define levels of analysis that lie between the computational and the algorithmic, providing a way to build a bridge between computational- and algorithmic-level models. The key idea is to push the notion of rationality, often used in defining computational-level models, deeper toward the algorithmic level. We offer a simple recipe for reverse-engineering the mind's cognitive strategies by deriving optimal algorithms for a series of increasingly more realistic abstract computational architectures, which we call “resource-rational analysis.”
Keywords Rational process models  Bayesian models of cognition  Levels of analysis  Algorithmic level  Resource‐rational models  Computational level
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DOI 10.1111/tops.12142
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References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the N Tscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.

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Citations of this work BETA

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